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“It is one thing to deconstruct Western metaphysics
 while inhabiting it, and it is quite another to work 
on decolonization as a form of  deconstruction, 
from the exteriority of  Western metaphysics; that is, 
from those places that Western metaphysics transformed into 
‘silenced societies’ or ‘silenced knowledges’” (Walter Mignolo). 
“A boundary is not that at which something 
stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary 
is that from which something begins 
its presencing. (Martin Heidegger)
Abstract
Weak thought as elaborated by Gianni Vattimo radicalizes hermeneutics when it 
recognizes its nihilist feature and as philosophy of  praxis. However, this radicalization 
does not go far enough, once it fails to reach the borders. It still remains circumscribed 
to a self-referenced identity, which conceives democracy and modernity as a process of  
reducing violence. For this reason, it is necessary to consider the weak thought from 
the in-between place of  borders to point that modernity does not constitute itself  by 
itself. This form of  democracy, far from being a process of  reducing violence, may 
result in exporting violence to other places. It creates those non-places where violence 
can have a free flow. With these critical remarks, I argue that if  we do not recognize the 
violent facet of  the constitution of  democracy and modernity, weak thought will hardly 
be able to adequately interpret the challenges of  authoritarianism and fundamentalism 
of  our times.
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Pensamento fraco, democracia e religião. Uma abordagem 
decolonial 
Resumo
O pensamento fraco radicaliza a hermenêutica quando reconhece sua vocação niilista e 
como filosofia da práxis. No entanto, essa radicalização não vai longe o suficiente, uma 
vez que não chega às fronteiras. Ela ainda permanece circunscrita a uma identidade 
autoreferenciada, que concebe democracia e modernidade como processos de redução da 
violência. Por essa razão, é necessário considerar o pensamento fraco a partir do entre-
lugar da fronteira para apontar que a modernidade não se constitui por si mesma. E que 
a democracia, longe de ser um processo de redução de violência, acaba por exportá-la 
para outros lugares. Ela cria não-lugares onde a violência encontra fluxo livre.  Com essas 
considerações críticas eu espero enfatizar que se não reconhecermos a face violenta da 
constituição da democracia e da modernidade, o pensamento fraco dificilmente será capaz 
de interpretar adequadamente os autoritarismos e fundamentalismos de nossa época.
Palavras-chave: decolonização, ser, metafísica, Gianni Vattimo.
Pensamiento débil, democracia y religión. Un enfoque 
decolonial
Resumen
El pensamiento débil (pensiero debole) radicaliza la hermenéutica mediante el 
reconocimiento de su vocación nihilista y como filosofía de la praxis. Sin embargo, 
esta radicalización no es suficiente, ya que no llega a las fronteras. Todavía permanece 
confinado a una identidad autorreferencial, que ve la democracia y la modernidad como 
procesos para reducir la violencia. Por lo tanto, es necesario considerar el pensamiento 
débil de la frontera para señalar que la modernidad no está constituida. Tal democracia, 
lejos de ser un proceso de reducción de la violencia, acaba exportándola a otros 
lugares. No crea lugares donde la violencia fluye libremente. Con estas consideraciones 
críticas, espero enfatizar que, si no reconocemos el rostro violento de la constitución 
de la democracia y la modernidad, el pensamiento débil difícilmente podrá interpretar 
adecuadamente los autoritarismos y fundamentalismos de nuestro tiempo.
Palabras clave: descolonización, ser, metafísica, Gianni Vattimo.
Introduction
Borders establish limits. From a geographical point of  view, it marks 
the edges of  neighborhoods, areas, cities, territories, and countries. At first 
glance, borders seem to be a cartographic concept. In some cases, they 
determine how far someone can go or how certain lines that cannot be 
surpassed. Being on the border is to go to the margins. One is no longer in 
the center, from which space and difference are organized. The place now 
is that of  the threshold of  the contact with the other side.
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But if  the first understanding of  the border is cartographic, the 
border certainly goes beyond mere spatial beacons. After all, how do we 
understand boundaries (even geographic ones) without considering time? 
How do we apprehend its formations if  we do not take into account the 
multiple games of  power that have determined choices? The border is 
not something that happens in isolation. As it demarcates, it is the place 
par excellence for the relations. For this reason, While border functions 
as a limit, the border points to another beginning. This is due to its 
constitutively relational character. A border exists in this in-between. It is 
not exactly one territory or another, but it is part of  both. Or rather, the 
border is what makes a territory recognizable as such. Perhaps, the border 
is the condition of  possibility for a territory. More than a limit, it is the 
in-between where relationships are most intensely experienced. 
What happens to thought when we try to place ourselves in that in-
between? In this case, it is not just a matter of  taking the boundary as an 
object of  thought. We are not proposing to think about the border, but to 
think from that fissured place. Not an object, but a perspective.
The critique of  metaphysics, also presupposed in evoking the border as 
a place of  thought, is an insurmountable topic of  our time. This is noticeable 
in the recurrence of  the topic, which includes several key contemporary 
thinkers, whose thoughts and solutions do not necessarily agree with each 
other. But, however abstract the philosophical formulations may seem, 
metaphysics and its consequences are also manifested in our daily lives. 
Nihilism, authoritarian governments, the thechnocratic society or even the 
ecological crisis can be interpreted as the ultimate expression of  the end 
of  metaphysics. For this very reason, if  thought wants to be more than a 
mere history of  philosophy (only as a commentary on texts canonized by 
a certain tradition), or more than justification for the positive sciences, it is 
in the critique of  metaphysics that it finds its most own possibility. In these 
issues lie the future paths for philosophy.
This perception was already present when Gianni Vattimo proposed in 
1983 with other Italian thinkers what has been known as “pensiero debole” 
(Vattimo, 2012). Weak thought was a way of  making sense of  the overcoming 
of  metaphysics and finding other ways to think beyond it. Later, several of  
these early proponents have moved away from this philosophical school 
(see Eco, 2007, p.37-56). Vattimo, however, has remained a faithful squire 
of  weak thought, drawing its consequences for particular areas of  life, such 
as science, religion, politics, aesthetics, etc. Its strand of  weak thought is 
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based on a hermeneutic approach that explores the consequences of  the 
radicalization of  the interpretative feature of  our being-in-the-world for 
philosophical discourse and rationality. In the 1990s, Vattimo had a greater 
concern with the topic of  religion, particularly with the role of  Christianity in 
a secularized society. From the 2000s onwards, his concept of  weak thought 
has unfolded on ethical and political issues based on the question of  how 
to ground critical attitudes and ethical-political commitments at the time of  
the dissolution of  reality and the end of  truth. These phases are intertwined, 
although each of  them has its own highlights.
Taking these developments of  weak thought into account, I propose 
from this in-between place of  the borders a critical analysis for the 
conception of  modernity and democracy elaborated by weak thought. First, 
we consider weak thought’s defense of  modernity as a process of  pacification 
and reduction of  violence. Once modernity happens in a horizon opened 
by Christian kenosis, it represents a movement towards the reduction of  
metaphysical truth and hence  of  violence. Furthermore, weak thought leans 
on a conception of  modernity as a strictly European phenomenon, closed in 
itself. However, to what extent can this reading of  modernity by Vattimo be 
kept when analyzed from its darker side, from the borders of  coloniality? Was 
there a reduction of  violence or was it exported to other places? With this 
approach of  weak thought, I intend to explore the paths that it has opened, 
but that it does not go through. 
1. Radicalizing Hermeneutics: Nihilism and Philosophy of 
Praxis
“[I]n its nihilistic version—as a radical philosophy of  praxis, 
hermeneutics fully recovers its religious origin and its political origin” (Vattimo, 
2016, p. 148). Hermeneutics as a philosophy of  praxis and, perhaps, as a 
practical philosophy. This may sound quite weird to the ears of  those who are 
used to thinking of  hermeneutics as a theory of  interpretation. This becomes 
much stranger when we consider some prominent names in this tradition. 
Martin Heidegger was criticized by Theodor Adorno for getting lost in the 
jargon of  Being and for elaborating an evasive discourse of  the practice and to 
promote the reification of  bourgeois perspective (Adorno, 1973, p.80). Given 
this, how can one understand hermeneutics as a philosophy of  practice?
Weak thought draws from the hermeneutics some nihilistic 
implications which were not carried forward by the thinkers who are part 
of  this philosophical scene. In other words, when weak thought radicalizes 
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hermeneutics by extracting its nihilistic consequences (Grondin, 2007, p.203-
216), its realization as a philosophy of  praxis becomes evident. Therefore, 
there is a double movement of  radicalization of  hermeneutics: its nihilistic 
assumptions are pulled from it, and subsequently, it is recognized as a 
philosophy of  praxis.
What does nihilism mean in this context? In the proposition of  
weak thought elaborated by Vattimo, nihilism does not have a negative 
connotation. Rather, nihilism represents our only alternative that overcomes 
metaphysics and its aftereffect. So, weak thought assumes that nihilism is the 
structuring axis of  the history of  Being. There is an inversion of  the sign. 
If  nihilism for Friedrich Nietzsche is a condition to be overcome through 
the creation of  new values, nihilism for weak thought is the means to get 
out of  metaphysics.1
When the end of  metaphysics is mentioned, we are not facing a simple 
thing: “[O]ne can simply equate the end of  philosophy as metaphysics with 
the affirmation, practical and political, of  democratic regimes. Where there 
is democracy, there cannot be a class of  the holders of  the ‘true’ truth who 
either exercise power directly (the philosopher-kings of  Plato) or provide 
the sovereign with rules for his behavior” (Vattimo, 2016, p.155; see also 
Vattimo, 2004, p.83-84). Weak thought maintains that metaphysics stands as 
an obstacle to democracy. In another elaboration: only when the notion of  
reality is mitigated or the concept of  truth as correspondence to a state of  
affairs is abandoned, it is possible to bear democracy (Vattimo, 2011, p.23). 
Once democracy cannot be established without a deep change in rationality, 
we see the strong link that connects the critique of  metaphysics and the 
ethical and political issues. 
It is not a matter of  enacting priority of  theory over practice, or vice 
versa. When one of  these situations happens, we have problems. When 
practical dimensions of  life are reduced to pre-existing theories, tendencies 
to rely on dogmatic impositions take place. On the other hand, to conceive 
theory as mere means for practice is to cut down the critical power of  
reflection. So, when hermeneutics presents itself  as philosophy of  practice, it 
is not intended for the reification of  the polarity between theory and practice 
or to keep one side and dismiss the other. Rather, there is reconfiguration 
1  According to Vattimo’s own words: “Hermeneutics is the thought of  accomplished nihilism, 
thought that aims to reconstruct rationality in the wake of  the death of  God and opposes 
any current of  negative nihilism, in other words the desperation of  those who continue to 
cultivate a sense of  mourning because ‘religion is no more’”(Vattimo, 2004, p.XVI).
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of  the hermeneutic circle: theory and practice must be understood in a 
circular manner, so that through the interpretive movement both of  them are 
constantly and mutually transformed. Even when hermeneutics is conceived 
as the theory of  interpretative horizons or the conditions of  possibilities 
of  being-in-the-world, it does not leave aside the practical dimension of  
existence. This is so not only because Heidegger conceived the instrument 
as the most basic way of  the Dasein’s approach to beings,2 but also because 
hermeneutics is dedicated to the structures that make experience possible in 
general. In this direction, can the philosophical hermeneutics become even 
more radical? Can some structures (such as race, gender, society, etc.) not only 
be the object of  analysis, but also be recognized as ways of  seeing, ways of  
constructing meaning, or ways of  inhabiting the world?3 With this, we have 
not yet answered some of  the basic questions: how are metaphysics, nihilism 
and  democracy related each other? Considering this bond between theory 
and practice, what could be a contribution of  weak thought for understanding 
democracy in our contemporary world? 
Taking this relationship between theory and practice in account, it 
is not enough to remain at the level of  mere historical description for the 
construction of  an “ontology of  the actuality.” To understand our time, it 
is necessary to start from the dimension of  praxis. However, we must pay 
attention to the relationships between this dimension and the ontological 
constructions that underlie it. In order to reach a reasonable concept of  
democracy (and how authoritarian positions have gained territory in the 
actual scenario), it is necessary to consider the notion of  metaphysics. I am 
not referring merely to a branch or a specialty of  philosophy. Rather, it is a 
mode of  rationality. Metaphysics “is the idea that, at the basis of  things, there 
is a stable order, a structure necessary, eternal, and hence rational, which it is 
our task to gain knowledge of  and adopt as a norm” (Vattimo, 2004, p .74). 
Thus, metaphysics is constituted by the belief  in an ahistorical and objective 
order that can be grasped by reason and expressed by language, becoming 
the rule. To make this possible, it is conceived that the Being has a stable 
structure, and on the other hand, the subject who knows it has a privileged 
access to the Being; that is, this subject assures itself  on a foundation - a 
2  “However, as we showed, the closest kind of  association is not mere perceptual cognition, 
but, rather, a handling, using, and taking care of  things which has its own kind of  
“knowledge”” (HEIDEGGER, 2012, §15, p. 63)
3  This is a movement underway in phenomenology. See, for example, Weiss; Murphy, 
Salamon, 2020.
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stable, safe and regulating place - from which the apprehension of  this 
structure is carried out.
Now, to attribute a stable structure to Being means to deny a 
fundamental feature of  human existence: its historicity and the consequent 
temporality of  the Being. Since for metaphysics, temporality is only a 
structure of  Being (and not the structure), the concept of  Being as presence 
becomes absolute, whose properties can be described and represented 
(Vattimo, 1989, p.18-19). This ontology, as long as it also becomes a search 
for the cause of  Being, finds its final goal in the entity who has the most 
perfect Being. This being is independent and continuous presence (Anwesenhei) 
from and in itself: pure ἐνέργεια (Heidegger, GA22, 2004, p. 178). With this 
movement, the question of  Being turns into the question of  the being on 
which all beings depend and which has Being in its most proper sense. With 
this movement, the ultimate foundation is achieved. This logic operation 
effaces the ontological difference, since Being and being are overlapped 
(Vattimo, 1993, P.163). Thus, the notion of  Being as presence leads and 
is reinforced by the establishment of  ultimate foundations. These ultimate 
foundations have taken on many designations in the history of  thought: God, 
subjectivity, reason, conscience, and so on. 4
This movement towards ultimate foundations is made with a purpose: 
the domination of  all beings, which has been made explicit at the time of  
the technique. In this approach, therefore, metaphysics is not something of  
specialized interest, but it is a way of  thinking that is anchored in ultimate 
foundations and which most fulfilled and brutal configuration has been the 
technological domain of  beings. Due to this ontological background, it is 
not sufficient for historical or sociological explanations to understand the 
4 Accordingly, Jacques Derrida says: “The history of  metaphysics, like the history of  the 
West, is the history of  these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix-if  you will pardon me 
for demonstrating so little and for being so elliptical in order to come more quickly to my 
principal theme-is the determination of  Being as presence in all senses of  this word. It 
could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center 
have always designated an invariable presence-eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, 
existence, substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and 
so forth” (Derrida, 2001, p.253).  “(...) in the course of  the history of  metaphysics from 
Plato on, presence becomes rigidly identified with the pure being present of  what is 
present; no further attention is paid to the ‘eventual’ character of  presence, until presence 
is in the end totally reduced to abjectness, to the Bestand of  technology as accomplished 
metaphysics (Vattimo, 1993, p.116-117)
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technique. Its roots are located in ontology. To be more precise, it is located 
in this overlap between Being and beings that outline metaphysics. And 
metaphysics has achieved its ending not because it has lost the game. Rather, 
it comes to an end when it fully realizes its intentions of  dominance over 
beings. It comes to an end because it has been fulfilled.
Given this brief  picture, what does it mean to say that nihilism 
provides a kind of  redemption? And, to return to our topic, what does the 
critique of  metaphysics have to do with democracy? Weak thought identifies 
three facets of  nihilism, though all of  them have a common denominator. In 
contrast with the realistic impulse that distinguishes metaphysics, it highlights 
the situated and the interpretative character of  our dwelling in the world. In 
a nutshell, nihilism denotes that we do not have access to such a structure of  
Being but that our way of  dwelling the world is an interpretive one. It is not 
just a matter of  “knowing the world,” but of  “dwelling in it.” After all, it is 
not only a cognitive act, but a way of  placing oneself  in the world: a mode 
of  existence. Because of  that, we are trapped in the network of  meaning and 
interpretations that are historically built which we have inherited. This does 
not mean that such network holds us in such a way that we are immobile. 
There is a certain malleability. But we think from this inherited network of  
meanings. To express in a more systematic way, the three aspects of  nihilism 
are: a) “everything is interpretation,” b) “this is already an interpretation,” 
and c) nihilism is the structuring axis of  the history of  Being. 
The Being that enables beings to come to the light and manifests 
themselves is this inherited network of  meanings, that is, language. To dwell 
in a world is to dwell in a language. Language does not have the sense of  the 
grammatical or neurofunctional structures; but it is a historically constructed 
heritage that constitutes the horizons in which beings come to meet human 
Dasein. This recognition brings us to Nietzschean terms: “everything is 
interpretation.” So, we have always been involved in a network of  meanings 
(language) that enables and limits us to a certain way of  access to the beings.
However, Vattimo would not be radical enough if  he also did 
not assume the complement of  Nietzsche’s saying: “this is already an 
interpretation” (Nietzsche, 1996, § 481). In other words, weak thought not 
only assumes that everything is interpretation, but the very affirmation of  the 
interpretative character of  our knowledge does not escape from this character. 
Behind the interpretation, there is no stable subject who can centralize 
and organize the dissemination of  conflicting interpretations. Thus, weak 
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thought assumes that everything is interpretation, including this statement, 
collapsing any attempt to attribute any pre-hermeneutical stability to Being. 
Therefore, affirming the interpretative character of  our being-in-the-world 
does not mean that we now know how things are. This very statement 
does not get away from being considered as interpretation. If  this solution 
avoids the contradiction, on the other hand, it brings up a very complex 
problem: is weak thought a kind of  relativism? If  everything is interpretation 
(including this sentence), and what is the criterion for classifying certain 
interpretations as fair and others as attempts of  domination? If  there are 
no ultimate grounds, is everything allowed? After all, would hermeneutics 
lead to irrationalism?
In order not to fall into irrationality or relativism, it is necessary to 
consider the third aspect of  nihilism. In addition to the recognition of  the 
radicality involved in the interpretative character of  our dwelling the world, 
nihilism also involves the history of  Being. Weak thought is rooted in the way 
it reconstructs the history of  Being by taking the weakening of  the strong 
structures of  metaphysics (nihilism) as its logic. This means the building of  
an interpretation that allows us to make sense of  a certain heritage from our 
insertion in this story. It is not a question of  assuming a necessary “destiny” 
for history, but of  constructing an interpretation able to significantly articulate 
this horizon, this heritage, and our place in it. From this point of  view, 
the history of  the West as attached to the history of  Being is interpreted 
as aiming towards weakening the strong structures of  metaphysics. With 
this, we have the criterion for differentiating acceptable and problematic 
interpretations: in what sense are they inserted and promote the weakening 
of  the strong structures of  metaphysics? In fact, it is not a coincidence 
that in his most recent texts, Vattimo has emphasized the dismissal of  the 
notion of  truth or the criticism of  the idea of   reality (Vattimo, 2010; 2011; 
2016; Vattimo, Zabala, 2011.). All of  these are, at the bottom, formulations 
for the basic principles of  what has been metaphysics as a manifestation of  
this history of  Being.5
5 This notion is quite an important difference between weak thought and deconstruction. 
The hermeneutic insertion in a set of  messages sent by the past (Ge-schik) and that 
gives shape to a history of  Being avoids a purely aesthetic approach to thinking after the 
death of  God. Vattimo argues that after a fall of  the ultimate foundations, we have a 
story, a message to answer. This history is a history of  Being, which is also metaphysics. 
The metaphysics, therefore, is not simply a mistake that must be unmasked, but it is a 
way of  how Being happens. Jacques Derrida falls into this estheticism precisely because 
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In other words, the radicalization of  hermeneutics leads us to the 
acceptance that there is no access to the structure of  Being as such, but 
only interpretations from a historically constructed horizon (of  an opening). 
Since his first writings, Vattimo uses a very appropriate expression to express 
this perception: hermeneutical foundation (Vattimo, 2012, p. 40). Then, it is 
not a matter of  mere relativism; there is a foundation. However, it does not 
claim to be necessary and unhistorical as the metaphysical foundation. As it 
is deeply immersed in temporality, it is a hermeneutical one.
What, then, allows Vattimo to equate the end of  metaphysics (also 
expressed as farewell to the truth or dissolution of  reality) with the affirmation 
of  democratic regimes? In fact, is it not the destruction of  the notion of  
truth one of  the big problems in democratic regimes today? Metaphysics can 
be said to be undemocratic because it is grounded in ultimate foundations, 
imposing silence and making dialogue impossible. As a result, it is imbued with 
violence. “Truth is not only ‘violent’ in that it turns away from solidarity, but it 
is ‘violence,’ because it can easily become an imposition on our own existence. 
Being ‘violent’ might imply that it can also be peaceful, but truth instead often 
implies an imposed description whose acceptance is assumed. Violence is the 
political meaning of  truth” (Vattimo, Zabala, 2011, p.18).
For this reason, the proposal to overcome metaphysics does not 
arise from the eminently epistemological or theoretical problems. Rather, 
the need for overcoming metaphysics is due to practical reasons: it is 
intrinsically violent. This polysemic word takes on a very precise meaning 
in weak thought: violence is the silencing of  the other. It is denied to the 
other the existence as long as he/she does not have granting the right to 
interrogate or speak owing to the impositions by an authority that sees 
itself  as legitimized on ultimate foundations. In Vattimo’s own terms, “I 
use ‘violence’ to mean the peremptory assertion of  an ultimate that, like 
the ultimate metaphysical foundation (or the God of  philosophers), breaks 
the dialogue and silences the interlocutor by refusing even to recognize 
the question “why” (Vattimo, 2004, p.98)6. It is important to note that the 
it considers that to get out of  metaphysics it is necessary to abandon questions about 
Being and its history. “If  it is not the story of  the history of  (the dissolution of) Being, 
deconstruction seems to be an ensemble of  conceptual performances entrusted to the sheer 
artistic flair [genialità] of  the deconstructor” (Vattimo, 1997, p. 12).
6 There are similar definitions in other Vattimo’s writings. “Rather, it is as a thinking of  the 
incontrovertible presence of  Being – as the ultimate foundation before which one can 
only fall silent and, perhaps, feel admiration – that metaphysics is a violent thinking: the 
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critique of  metaphysics is not only motivated by ethics, but more than that: 
the ethics is akin to the possibility of  establishing and keeping a dialogical 
attitude. Even so, the basic violence of  metaphysics lies in the interruption 
of  dialogue. Since the claim to the structure of  Being or to the authority 
of  ultimate foundations is not recognized as an interpretation, it implies 
silencing the divergent and eliminating the possibility of  questions. In this 
sense, it shows itself  as the original form of  other kinds of  violence. After 
all, when someone believes that he/she has the true order of  things, he/
she should only communicate this truth to others. It is a duty. A moral 
obligation to convince others of  this truth. In this way, the matrix form 
of  violence is found in the silencing by resorting to the ultimate structures 
and foundations. From this ground, it is possible to legitimize all forms of  
abuse in relation to others.
So, when weak thought criticizes the notion of  truth, it does not think 
of  a simple abandonment of  the notion of  truth, but a reconfiguration of  it. 
Instead of  the conception of  truth as an imposition of  one perspective over 
others, truth it is a dialogical construct. Since it is a dialogical construction, 
it requires responsibility from those who take part in this (Vattimo, 2010, 
p.63). The truth is not ever settled, but it is built in dialogue in the midst of  
the conflict of  interpretations. Conflict that should not be brought back to 
agreement, but it can find points of  articulation. For this reason, Vattimo 
affirms that the human being who can live in a contemporary democratic 
society is the Nietzschean Übermensch. This citizen is the overman, since he/
she lives in-between several interpretations without assuming one of  them 
as a definitive one (Vattimo, 2002, p. 203). 
To sum up, since metaphysics call for the legitimacy of  a principle 
that imposes itself  in an authoritarian way, it does not fit in with democratic 
principles. For this very reason, the critique of  metaphysics is tantamount 
to the establishment of  democracy. With this we can understand how 
foundation, if  it is given in incontrovertible evidence that no longer admits further enquire, 
is like an authority that keeps things quiet and takes control over explanation” (Vattimo, 
1997, p. 31).  Or still: “If  there is a true nature to things, there is always an authority - the 
pope, the party, the‘objective ’scientist, etc. - who knows it better than I do and who can 
also impose it against my will. What is the use of  insisting on objectivity and the reality of  
the truth if  not to guarantee the authority to someone?” (Vattimo, 2001, p. 30). “If  truth 
claims are also always claims of  political power, that is, violence, and if  this same violence is 
nothing else than the “silencing” of  other interlocutor through an apparent dialogue, truth 
and violence become interchangeable” (Vattimo, Zabala, 2011, p.18).
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hermeneutics when recognizing itself  as philosophy of  praxis is able to 
recover its political origins. But, what about the religious origin?
Regarding this, weak thought pursues the recovery of  a structuring 
element from the Western historical horizon: kenosis. Particularly during the 
period when Vattimo was a member of  the European Parliament, he has 
dedicated himself  to the reflection about Europe’s identity. In this moment, 
Christianity occupied an important role in his proposals. Although his main 
concern was to demonstrate how Christianity inaugurates a framework of  
references that is decisive for the Western hermeneutic horizon, in many 
ways his approach to religion was almost theological. For Vattimo, since 
Christianity affirms that God made himself  human through Jesus, we come 
across the notion of  a God who takes weakness as a possibility. This episode 
has opened up this epoch of  the weakening of  Being and it is the nihilist 
element within metaphysical tradition. The history of  Being is marked by this 
tendency to put in question the rigid and authoritarian notions of  truth due 
to the gospel principle of  a God who becomes a human. Because of  that, 
weak thought gives support to a comprehension that highlights the ethical 
feature of  Christianity as part of  the Western frame of  references.7
From a scientific or even some religious point of  view, there is a 
prevailing perspective that understands secularization as a departure from 
religion. In this sense, modernity would represent the “other side” or a 
dismiss of  Christian religious beliefs, practices, and worldview. According to 
this perspective, secularization is the process in which religion loses its role 
as an articulator of  social life, to become one more social sphere alongside 
others. As a result, not only do religious symbols lose their social and cultural 
importance, but society itself  deviates from the religious matrix. However, for 
weak thought, there is no such opposition between modernity (secularization) 
and Christianity. Quite the opposite. Since Christianity is this tendency to 
the weaken of  the strong structures of  metaphysics, modernity would be 
nothing more than a deepening of  the Christian message. If  the history of  
the West is the history of  the weakening of  Being inaugurated by Kenosis, it 
does not make sense to distinguish profane history from the religious one. 
7  It is important to notice how weak thought has inspired some theological perspectives. 
In 2006, influenced by these ideas, John Caputo published the book The Weakness of  God, 
in which he gives some development to a Weak theology. Recently, Gustavo Gutiérrez 
has recognized the contributions of  weak thought to a theology from Latin America and 
is concerned with the poor (Gutiérrez, 2005, p.140).
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Then, “In other and more provocative words: I mean that today the West, 
understood as the land of  the sunset and of  weakening, is Christianity’s 
truth” (Vattimo, 2002b, p. 80).
We still shall return to this polemic quote. For now, it is important to 
notice that Vattimo supports a normative understanding of  both democracy 
and Christianity. He is doing this when he pulls the hermeneutics as a 
philosophy of  praxis back to its political and religious origins. When I say 
that we are facing some normative propositions, I understand normativity not 
as indicating what something must necessarily be, but what something could 
be. Thus, when Vattimo understands that Christianity is best characterized 
by weakness and love, or democracy by dialogue that intends to build truth, 
one should not understand that he is offering a description of  religion in 
current historical conditions. Indeed, he is very critical of  certain positions 
of  the Catholic Church or of  authoritarian political decisions. Rather, his 
intention is to indicate the potentialities that Christianity and democracy 
have. Both possess elements in their hermeneutic horizon that would make 
this other configuration possible. And the normative approach explores 
those possibilities. And the normative as possibility works as a criterion 
for the establishment of  criticism to the historical forms of  democracy 
and Christianity. If  we take their propositions as descriptions, they sound, 
to say the least, naive. After all, while he speaks of  Christianity as the 
responsible for the weakening of  metaphysical structures, the religious form 
of  Christianity that stands out most in the twentieth first century is that of  
fundamentalisms. Nothing is more metaphysical than this kind of  religiosity 
in our time. This is the reason why they recognize and ally themselves 
with metaphysical and anti-democratic governments (with forgiveness for 
pleonasm) in current politics: the far-right ones. 
This consideration, however, should not be used as an excuse for 
the treatment of  fundamentalism.8 It has received little attention from 
8  “(...) It is not hard to see them as neurotic defenses of  identity and belonging in reaction 
to the infinite widening of  horizons entailed by the culmination of  the epoch of  the world 
picture. Without a clear appropriation of  its own nihilistic vocation, hermeneutic ethics 
can only respond to this situation by seeking to contain it, as if  it were essentially a matter 
of  defending a kernel of  values that are under threat and inexorably destined to be swept 
away. This, on close inspection is the tenor, the Stimmung,  of  hermeneutics’ humanism’s 
attitude towards the techno-scientific Society (...).Instead of  reacting to the dissolution of  the 
principle of  reality by attempting to recuperate a sense of  identity and belonging that are at 
once reassuring and punitive, it is a matter of  grasping nihilism as a chance of  emancipation” 
(Vattimo, 1997, p. 39-40). See also Vattimo, 2004, pp. 91-92; and 1998, p.83). 
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weak thought. They have been very fast called as a neurotic and defensive 
reaction to the plurality of  today’s world. The lack of  ultimate foundations 
can build overmans, but also cause resentment in people who neurotically 
cling to ultimate foundations. They are called neurotic because more of  their 
foundations are threatened, more strongly and violently fundamentalists tend 
to cling to their foundations.
Why do perspectives that claim ultimate foundations sound so attractive 
at the time of  God’s death? Are they simply signs of  neurosis (as Vattimo often 
designates it) or are they symptoms of  deeper things? Could, for example, the 
return of  religion with this fundamentalist tone indicate a certain limit in the 
Nietzsche’s announcement of  the death of  God? According to the Nietzsche’s 
God-foundation thesis, he had the function of  organizing the world, providing 
security to enable social life. However, when the world has become safe, the 
God-foundation thesis is dispensable. For this reason, Nietzsche could say 
that God is dead (Vattimo, 2002a, p. 257; 2002b, p. 12; Rorty e Vattimo, 2005, 
p. 74). We should consider the persistence of  this thesis from another point 
of  view. Would not the return of  fundamentalism and the affirmation of  a 
moral God be related to the unsafe conditions of  the current world? Disasters, 
threats to the continuation of  life, attacks, violence, etc. would they not lead 
to the need to return of  the God-foundation? Vattimo does not seem inclined 
to conceive things in this direction, which would imply a reformulation of  his 
thinking, strongly dependent on Nietzsche.
Radicalizing even More? Moving to the Borders
Thus, as we have seen, weak thought articulates nihilism and Christianity 
under the command of  overcoming metaphysics and the promotion of  
democracy. But, let’s move to the border. Not only to the border as a limit, but 
the border as situated on the margins, the inter-between of  colonial difference 
where the global designs meet local histories (Mignolo, Walsh, 2018, p.112; 
Mignolo, 2000, p. 67). This denotation is very important. The inter-between is 
this meeting place, with multiple and unpredictable relationships. In this sense, 
it is not a simple denial of  modernity. To think from the borders is not a sort 
of  anti-colonialism. In the same perspective of  weak thought, it reveals the 
situated feature of  designs that want to be universal. The modern raises local 
histories to the status of  global designs is nothing else than the absolutization 
of  some finite hermeneutical horizons. This criticism, however, does not mean 
abandoning the recognition of  the impact of  modernity and its narratives on 
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the peripheries and borders of  the world.9 In fact, the opposite is true. The 
point is to recognize how this modernity is also dependent on these margins, 
although it often forgets itself, or strives to forget it.
Since it emphasizes the finitude and hermeneutic aspect of  human 
dwelling, weak thought criticizes perspectives that deny this situated 
condition of  any enunciation. Vattimo, for example, already in the 1990s, 
has emphasized this. He has noticed that as long as modernity spreads across 
the globe and makes the ideal of  a universal history possible, this project 
(of  a universal history) proves to be unfeasible. Mainly, owing to the means 
of  communication, the West realized that there were other cultures that 
were not allowed to be reduced to its logic, that Europe is not the most 
developed and finished achievement of  humanity. In short, “If  I profess my 
system of  values  - religious, ethical, political, ethnic - in this world of  plural 
cultures, I must also have an acute awareness of  the historicity, contingency 
and limitation of  all these systems, starting with my own” (Vattimo, 1992, 
p. 43). The recognition that the global village is not made up solely of  the 
West has led to a weakening, or even made impossible that reality can be 
apprehended by an ultimate foundation.
If  weak thought has this openness to the other, it does so with 
earnest limitations. Indeed, it seems that weak thought points to some ways, 
but does not explore them. If  it radicalizes the nihilistic consequences and 
hermeneutics as a philosophy of  praxis, weak thought still seems withdrawn 
from this radical experience of  the borders. Regarding this, weak thought and 
its interpretation of  Christianity builds a mythological version of  democracy 
with a double exclusion: the constitutive violence of  democracy as well the 
forgetting of  the other, the darker side of  modernity. In this sense, it restores 
silences (and as we have seen, this is violence). This non-recognition is a way 
of  imposing silence on the other.
9  Regarding this, Walter Mignolo affirms: “Briefly, I found in all these examples the sense of  
that border thinking structure itself  on a double consciousness, a double critique operating 
on the imaginary of  the modern/colonial world system, of  modernity/coloniality. As such, 
it establishes alliances with the internal critique, the monotopic critique of  modernity from 
the perspective of  modernity itself  (e.g., Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Marx, Freud, 
Derrida) at the same time that is marks the irreducible difference of  border thinking as 
a critique from the colonial difference (…) Border thinking brings to the foreground the 
irreducible epistemological difference, between the perspective from the colonial difference, 
and the forms of  knowledge that, being critical of  modernity, coloniality, and capitalism, 
still remain ‘within’ territory, ‘in custody’ of  the ‘abstract universals’” (Mignolo, 2000, p.87). 
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One of  the most powerful forms of  effacement of  the other is the 
construction of  mythologies. For those who study religion, it is very clear 
that mythologies are not simple lies or fables. Rather, they undertake the 
explanation of  certain things by offering a vision of  wholeness. They have 
a great legitimating power. Thus, myths are not a description of  a state of  
things.  But they make an effort, often referring to a mythical origin, to 
offer an explanation of  why things are as they are. Unlike science, they are 
not reduced to specific aspects of  life, but build panoramic and totalizing 
views. Once they become consolidated, these explanations and totalizing 
visions function as a justification for practices, institutions, relations, 
identities so forth. We should not forget that the history of  Being is a sort 
of  mythological reconstruction. But what is forgotten in this story of  the 
forgetting of  the Being? While remaining on the surface of  exaltation of  
the pacifying character of  democracy, does not this reconstruction restore 
violence that it used to blame metaphysics? Putting it more explicitly. 
Considering a certain appropriation of  the Christian heritage, weak thought 
assumes the conception that democracy is organized around pacification and 
reduction of  violence. Moreover, when weak thought couples Christianity with 
Europe, it gives support to the understanding that democracy is a typically 
European phenomenon. But, is it possible when we consider modernity from 
the point of  view of  the border?
In weak thought, there is an opening to think of  democracy as 
something that is beyond Western societies. However, even if  there is this 
possibility, this understanding is not totally surpassed (Vattimo; Rorty, 
2005, p.72; Vattimo, 2010, p.61). As Vattimo says, “The West, feeling the 
exigency of  affirming its own cultural identity (…) does not find unifying 
and identifying elements other than, in a secularized form, a shared Christian 
origin” (Vattimo, 2002, p.74). These and other statements that identify 
Christianity with Europe and reduce democracy to the inner level of  Western 
societies is a sign of  how weak thought does not surpass Eurocentricism. 
It is as if  European society and culture is closed in itself, confined within 
the limits of  its own territories and story. In this case, the border is not an 
openness to another, but a limit that is closed on itself. It is true that one 
of  the biggest issues of  metaphysics is the objectiveness and the ultimate 
foundations. But Heidegger warns us throughout his writings that being is 
not a substance, but it is a relation. The ready-to-hand entities presupposes 
a remissive background. Even in his later writings, when Heidegger talks 
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about the divines, mortals, earth and sky, he always emphasizes that the 
beings are in relation. 
Now, what about the “darker” side of  this story? Is it possible to 
understand modernity without taking into account its double: coloniality? 
At this point, it is worth recalling a fundamental contribution from 
phenomenology. The whole process of  construction of  subjectivity passes 
through the other. In other words, subjectivity is intersubjectivity. Thus, the 
construction that an individual makes of  his/her identity passes through 
intersubjective relations. It is a well known passage from Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness in which he describes how the gaze of  the other steals my being, 
and at the same time thi gaze constitutes myself  (Sartre, 1984, p. 340). 
Therefore, no identity-building process takes place without establishing a 
relationship with another. As this other participates in this construction, the 
other becomes part of  that identity.
Thus, it is no coincidence that, at the moment in which the biggest 
European empires are constituted through territorial expansion and conquest, 
democratic regimes are implemented on the European continent. This 
colonial system is not a mere externality or consequence of  modernity, 
but it is at its heart. This coloniality runs through economy and politics, 
and  also through culture. What makes modernity not a typical European 
phenomenon is that it could not be carried out without this obscure face. If  
we consider modernity from the mythology of  the weakening of  the strong 
structures, it is a European phenomenon. But, in a broad sense, modernity 
takes on a planetary connotation. It affects even the ends of  the earth. And 
Europe builds its own identity in the relationship with this other, particularly 
in the way it conceives this other. Regardless of  how Europe differs itself  
from this other, appropriates it or effaces it. Without considering this other, 
modernity and the conception that it represents, a reduction of  violence 
through democracy tends to assert itself  as a form of  imperialism or even 
triumphalism. The previous claim by Vatttimo’s that secularized Europe would 
be the fullest realization of  Christianity is not just a controversial claim. It is 
an evidence of  how ignoring coloniality can lead to a certain triumphalism. 
Particularly, in a period in which there are attempts to understand Christianity 
as a plural phenomenon.10
10  Dale Irvin, for example, defines the field of  Studies called World Christianity as “the study 
of  World Christianity seeks to investigate and understand Christian communities, Faith, and 
practice as they are found on six continents, expressed in diverse ecclesial traditions, and 
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If  the triumphalism of  this kind of  posture is more evident, it hides 
yet another feature even more harmful. This exclusion of  coloniality is 
a reification of  the discourse that affirms democracy and modernity as 
peacemakers. The point is not only that it is necessary to consider coloniality, 
but how it takes place in this system. As we might see, this kind of  view 
hides the violence that constitutes democracy.
So, to what extent does this type of  construction not work as a 
reinforcement for the idea that modernity and democratic societies would be 
pacified societies, that is to say distinct from warrior societies? Indeed, often 
using René Girard, Vattimo makes this distinction in religious terms. The 
weakening Christian God differs from the deities of  natural religion. This 
kind of  religion is metaphysical, affirming a natural and violent conception 
of  deity. Christianity here would seem to represent the overcoming of  
this relationship with divinity, conceiving God as a friend (Vattimo, 1997, 
p. 50-51). But, is that so? Would not violence remain at the heart of  the 
constitution of  modernity and democracies?
At the end, it seems that this pacifying discourse works based on 
the hiding of   violence that constitutes modernity and democracy. This 
picture becomes clearer only when we consider coloniality as constitutive 
of  modernity. The violence and brutality of  modernity are not pacified, but 
are exported and outsourced. Achille Mbembe remembers this process and 
gives a name to those territories to where violence is exported: “non-places” 
or “third places.” In the colony, to where the unwanted ones were sent, 
the legal system works based on certain suspensions. Here, the sovereign 
can violate and kill assured of  his impunity. The violence and violations 
questioned in the metropolises could find free flow in colonies. “The cost 
of  the mythological logics required for modern democracies to function and 
survive is the exteriorization of  their originary violence to third places, to 
nonplaces, of  which the plantation, the colony, or, today, the camp and the 
prison, are emblematic figures” (Mbembe, 2019, p. 27).
informed by the multitude of  historical and cultural experiences in a world transformed by 
globalization. It is concerned with both the diversity of  local expressions of  Christian life and 
faith throughout the world, and the variety of  ways these interact with one another critically 
and constructively across time and space. It is particularly concerned with marginalized 
experiences or expressions of  Christian faith that have been underrepresented in scholarship 
and underappreciated for their wider contributions” (Irvin, 2016, p.04)
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This understanding coming from the borders broadens our horizons. 
After all, the colonial model does not refer to the historical past, to the epoch 
of  the building of  modernity and democracy. In fact, the colonial matrix 
is  our past, present, and future. These non-places are replicated in spaces 
where life is exposed without mediation: be it the concentration, the refugee 
camp, the prisons, the slums, and so forth. Instead of  being the reverse of  
democracy, would these places of  exclusion not be implicit in it? Would they 
not be a crucial part for keeping this “pacifying” character of  democracy 
working? Within the colonies themselves this is reflected in how occupation 
of  space is organized. Cities are arranged to create and keep the segregation 
and the hierarchy between who has rights and who has just the “bare life.” 
In these contexts, democracy as dialogue and the overcoming of  violence is 
merely an abstraction.
Giorgio Agamben has argued that the concentration camp became the 
model for the exercise of  sovereignty as a state of  exception at the end of  
the twentieth century (Agamben, 1998). In my view, however, Mbembe goes 
further. It was not the concentration camp, but the colony that was in the 
first place where these technologies and devices were tested. These territories 
had and have to bear all the violence that was exported to keep the image 
of  democracy as a peaceful process. 
Would not this violence exported to these non-spaces of  the colony 
and their actual correspondents also help explain the resurgence of  
fundamentalisms at a time when Vattimo projects weak and democratic 
thought? When I mention fundamentalism, I am not only referring to 
the religious one, but to authoritarian governments that are taking over 
democratic regimes. To a large extent, this cursed part, this forgotten or 
muffled violence comes back and spreads colonial practices on a global scale. 
This is a face of  what can be properly called necropolitics. On the one hand, 
there is the fictional creation of  enemies. For the simple fact that they exist, 
they are seen as a threat to the established social hierarchy and, therefore, 
must be eliminated. They are immigrants, blacks, LGBTQ, indigenous, etc. 
On the other hand, under the argument that in order to preserve democratic 
rights they must be temporarily suspended, the normalization of  the state of  
exception gives to sovereignty this power to decide who has right to live or 
die (Mbembe, 2019). If  one adopts the reading of  modernity and democracy 
as peacemakers, how can we understand the increasing use of  these resources 
by contemporary democracies? If  modernity is only a deepening of  the 
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Christian message as the weakening, how can we explain the sacrificial logic 
that governs our lives at the end of  metaphysics beyond a characterization 
of  “neurotic”?
With this critique, I am not proposing discarding democracy. Far from 
it. But, as weak thought seems to imply, the more this violent face constitutive 
of  democracy is hidden, the less it is understandable how explicit forms of  
authoritarianism gain strength in the contemporary world. It is also clear that 
authoritarianism is not something opposed to liberalism or neoliberalism, 
but is rather its darker, nocturnal side. Swept to the non-places. “Almost 
everywhere the law of  blood, the law of  the talion, and the duty to one’s 
race—the two supplements of  atavistic nationalism—are resurfacing. The 
hitherto more or less hidden violence of  democracies is rising to the surface, 
producing a lethal circle that grips the imagination and is increasingly difficult 
to escape. Nearly everywhere the political order is reconstituting itself  as a 
form of  organization for death” (Mbembe, 2019, p.06-07).
Conclusion
If  weak thought radicalizes hermeneutics recognizing its nihilistic and 
practical character, it does not reach the border. It still remains circumscribed 
to a self-referenced identity, which conceives democracy and modernity as 
a process of  reducing violence. As a constitutive feature of  metaphysics, 
violence is the interruption of  dialogue and the silencing of  the other. It is 
true that weak thought recognizes its deep contingency. Consequently, there 
are interpretations and worldviews that cannot be submitted to a single 
horizon. However, it does not seem to assume the relational and constitutive 
character of  this border with the same radicality. For this reason, it is 
necessary to look from the in-between place of  the borders to point out that 
modernity does not constitute itself  by itself. And that democracy, far from 
being a process of  reducing violence or incompatibility with metaphysics, 
brings within it much of  that metaphysics in its most brutal sense. The 
creation of  non-places where it can impose itself  without proper mediation, 
freely exercising its violence. With that, I do not intend to dismiss democracy 
as the most viable proposal. Rather, if  we do not recognize the violent face 
of  its constitution, weak thought will hardly be able to adequately interpret 
the authoritarianism and fundamentalisms of  our times.
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